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Abstract and Keywords
Italy stands out among advanced industrialized democracies because of its frequency of 
major electoral reforms. In the postwar period, Italy has experienced four major electoral 
systems: the proportional representation (PR) system of the First Republic (1948–1992), 
mixed-member majoritarian (MMM, 1993–2005), and two varieties of PR with majority 
bonus (2005–2015, 2015–). In addition, there have been many failed attempts at electoral 
reform through legislation or referendum. The frequency of electoral reform makes Italy 
an important case for investigating the causes and effects of electoral system change. 
However, the path to each change has been somewhat idiosyncratic: the major reform of 
1993 came against the backdrop of revelations of massive corruption, while the 2005 
reform can be understood as an attempt to engineer divided government by an incumbent 
coalition expecting losses in the next election. The effects of the electoral reforms have 
also not always been as expected.
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Italy stands out among established democracies because of multiple reforms of its 
electoral system. Established democracies generally tend to retain their electoral systems 
(Katz 2005), and the total number of electoral reforms over the last seventy years in 
established democracies stands at approximately twenty. Among the worldwide reforms, 
Italy is remarkably well represented, with three main electoral system changes during its 
democratic experience (and a fourth  reform has now come into operation, as we shall 
see). After the end of fascism and the dictatorship, a new democratic regime was 
established and a parliamentary republic initiated in 1948. Since that time, Italy’s 
electoral law has been amended several times, and many other attempts to reform it were 
repelled. What were the triggers of such reforms? In Italy, the “causes” for electoral 
reforms were a mix of conjunctures: leadership initiative, judicial action, mass pressure, 
and international change and constraints. Moreover, if triggers of reform are “unlikely to 
be predictable from systemic characteristics” (Katz 2005, 74), in Italy it is not easy to 
generalize about the causes of reform. Thus, in the presence of such a mix of variables, it 
is necessary to analyze both the characteristics of each electoral reform in Italy and the 
context in which it is generated.
A diachronic study of the Italian case is opportune both for an in-depth analysis and for a 
general test of theory. As we know, electoral systems matter: they “may make a big 
difference to the shape of the party system, to the nature of government (coalition or 
single-party), to the kind of choices facing voters at elections, to the ability of voters to 
hold their representative(s) personally accountable, to the behavior of 
parliamentarians” (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 4). The next sections detail each of these 
systems and the reasons for their adoption, before turning to an assessment of the 
consequences.
Italy’s Electoral Systems: Provisions and 
Origins
Italy has formally had four different electoral systems between 1948 and 2015, not 
counting the proportional representation (PR) system used to elect the Constituent 
Assembly in 1946. The provisions of each law to be discussed in this section are 
summarized in detail in Table 1.
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Table 1 Electoral Systems in Italy (1946–2017) (Chamber of Deputies)
Electoral 
law 
number 
and date 
of 
approval
Election Electoral 
system
Formula 
and Quota
Threshold Preferenc
e voting
Bonus Number 
of 
Districts
Assembly 
Size
1946, n. 
74, March 
10
1946 Open-list 
PR (OLPR)
LR–quota 
(+1 or +2, 
depending 
on district 
magnitude)
- up to 2-3 no 31 556
1948, n. 6, 
January 20
1948, n. 
26, 
February 5
1948 OLPR LR–
Imperiali 
(+3)  
 1 seat up to 3-4 no 31 574
1953, n. 
148, March 
31
1953 
(did not 
come into 
operation)
OLPR with 
bonus
LR–
Imperiali 
(+3)  
1 seat up to 3-4 380 seats 
to winning 
party or 
coalition > 
50% 
31 590
(1)
(8) (2)
(7)
(5)
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1954, n. 
615, July 
31
1956, n. 
493, May 
16
1957, n. 
361, March 
30
1958 OLPR LR–
Imperiali 
(+2)  
1 seat and
300.000 
votes
up to 3-4 no 32 596
1963 630
1968 630
1972 630
1976 630
1979 630
1983 630
1987 630
1991, n. 
200, July 3
1992 OLPR LR–
Imperiali 
(+2)  
1 seat and
300.000 
votes
up to 1 no 32 630
1993, n. 
277, 
August 4
1994 MMM Plurality 
(475) + LR-
Hare (155)
4% 
national
  475 SSD + 
1 national
 
1996 no no 630
2001    
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2005, n. 
270, 
December 
21
2006 PR with 
bonus 
(closed 
lists)
2008 LR-Hare 4% party; 
10% 
coalition; 
2% party in 
coalition
no 340 seats 
to the 
winning 
party or 
coalition
26 630 
2013          
2015, n. 
52, May 6
none PR with 
bonus 
(open lists 
with 
protection 
for list-
heads)
LR-Hare 3% 
national
up to 2 340 seats 
to party 
with > 40%
100 630 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on Italian Minister of Interior data.
( ) In 1946 voters could cast three preferences votes in constituencies returning to up 16 members, and four preferences votes in 
larger constituencies.
( ) Voters could cast three preferences votes in constituencies returning to up 15 members, and four preferences votes in larger 
constituencies.
(4)
(3)
(6)
(4)
1
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( ) If voters cast their first preference to choose a woman, the second vote must go to select a man, and vice versa. Otherwise, the 
second preference will be considered void.
( ) 12 seats attributed to representatives of Italians living abroad, and one seat for the Aosta Valley region.
( ) 380 of 590 seats in the Chamber of deputies would be given to any alliance of parties that won at least 50 per cent of the votes 
plus one vote. It must be underlined that two different quotas were indicated. First, if the bonus would be assigned, then the quota 
will be calculated on two different bases: votes / 380 seats for the winning party(ies), and votes / 209 for the loosing parties. Vice 
versa, if no party had obtained the 50% plus one vote, then the 1948 system would have worked with a quota plus 3.
( ) On January 25, 2017 the Constitutional Court dropped the second-ballot to allocate the majority bonus for the Chamber of 
Deputies in order to make “more similar” the two electoral systems for the two Houses, albeit the Senate would still have a regional 
allocation of seats. However, the supreme judges kept the provision of a majority bonus allocated to the party with 40% of votes.
( ) The total score for the coalition parties was 49.2% with the DC being the pivotal party (40.1%).
( ) The allocation of seat by large remainders method with Hare quota was allowed to parties able to obtain at least one seat (entire 
quota) in one of the districts. Since 1957, in addition parties had to obtain also at the least 300,000 votes nationally.
3
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The PR Electoral System of the Italian First Republic (1948–1992)
For the first democratic parliamentary election in 1948, a PR formula (Imperiali quota 
with largest remainders)  with preference voting was adopted. The system of proportional 
representation was introduced before the approval of the constitution,  and was never 
included in it, so that reforming the rules does not require a constitutional amendment. 
The system combined comparatively high proportionality with intraparty competition. 
From 1946 to 1992, Italy had thirty-two electoral districts.  It was a two-tier “remainder 
pooling” system (for a general definition, see Gallagher and Mitchell’s chapter) in which 
remainder seats were allocated in an upper tier. The number of seats allocated in the 
upper tier depended on the number of votes not used by parties to elect members of 
parliament (MPs) in the districts (typically about 10 percent of the total). Nevertheless, to 
participate in the allocation of seats by remainders, parties had to satisfy two 
requirements: to have obtained at least three hundred thousand votes at the national 
level and to have succeeded in electing at least one candidate in one district, which meant 
having a geographically concentrated electoral support of about sixty thousand to seventy 
thousand voters.
The PR open-list system emphasized intraparty competition among candidates (Carey and 
Shugart 1995) and also generated—or at the very least did not impede—party 
factionalism. Between 1946 and 1991, voters were allowed to cast up to four preference 
votes depending on district magnitude (Passarelli 2017).  Therefore, the way in which 
candidates were elected from a list was completely determined by the individual 
preference votes cast by the party’s voters in a given district.  During that period, the 
only reforms of the electoral system involved changes in the denominator used in 
calculating the quota (Passarelli 2014).
Although it never actually came into operation, the legge truffa (swindle law) of 1953 
could be counted among Italy’s electoral reforms. This system aimed to ensure a 
parliamentary majority.  The Christian Democrats (DC) won an absolute majority of seats 
(53.1 percent in 1948) with 48.5 percent of votes. This was the only election in which a 
single party obtained a parliamentary majority. Nevertheless, the DC’s decline in local 
elections and the fear of a neo-fascist resurgence induced the ruling party to seek a 
system that would secure a stable majority. Eventually approved over the vehement 
opposition of the Communist and Socialist parties, the law stated that after the elections, 
380 of 590 seats in the Chamber of Deputies would be given to any alliance of parties that 
won over 50 percent of the votes (Katz 2001, 59; Renwick 2010). The coalition was 
composed of four parties: the DC, the Social Democrats (PSDI), the Liberals (PLI), and 
the Republicans (PRI). The total score for the coalition parties was 49.2 percent, with the 
DC being the dominant party (40.1 percent). However, this good performance was not 
sufficient for them to reach their goal. In fact, although they lacked only 204,742 votes to 
reach a majority and consequently the bonus of seats, the legge truffa did not come into 
operation. The law was repealed in 1954, restoring the 1948 system until the 1990s.
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Electoral Reform of 1993 from Proportional Representation to Mixed-
Member Majoritarian: Mani Pulite, Tangentopoli, and Scorporo
The major change to the Italian electoral system that was introduced in the 1990s started 
with a citizens-initiated referendum held on June 9, 1991. This measure modified one 
critical component of the electoral law, although only partially. Voters were asked 
whether the clause relating to the law on the number of preference votes available to the 
voter should be reduced to just one. The result was 95.6 percent in favor, with a turnout 
of 65.1 percent. The catalyst for this change was the government’s refusal to introduce a 
new electoral law to accompany the local government reform introduced in 1990. The 
referendum of 1991 represented the first step on the path away from proportional 
representation in the Italian system, although only partially, as we shall see.
In the early 1990s, Italy’s established political system collapsed amid dramatic changes in 
the international political system with the end of the Cold War, judicial activism and 
investigations, and a widespread popular disaffection, culminating in several 
referendums. The judiciary, especially in Milan, laid bare the widespread links between 
politicians and illegal activities. The so-called mani pulite (clean hands) investigations 
targeted many MPs and party secretaries such as those of the DC and the PSI. The 
Tangentopoli (bribe city) scandal finally discredited the Italian ruling class among a 
public fed up with rampant corruption.
Among other consequences, these events led to the adoption in 1993 of a new electoral 
law. Although a referendum (based on the citizens’ initiative) on the Italian constitution 
does not allow the initiation of new laws—it merely allows the abrogation of a bill or part 
of it—the referendum of April 1993 clearly represented a breakthrough in the political 
system and the electoral framework. The overwhelming result undoubtedly paved the way 
for the successive complete reform of the electoral law. The parliament could not ignore 
the “popular will,” namely, the demand for a significant and real change that would 
especially emphasize the role of voters in determining the formation of the government 
and the choice of its leader. The long-standing phenomenon of prime ministers chosen via 
a bargaining process among the party leaders was an established ritual that was 
particularly disliked by voters. More than eight voters in ten (82.7 percent, on 77.1 
percent turnout) decided to answer yes to the question posed by the referendum on the 
desire to modify the rules for the election of the Senate, in particular by eliminating the 
proportional part of the seat distribution .
The consequences of the referendum were significant institutionally and politically. The 
result was a Senate in which 75 percent of seats were allocated by plurality in single-seat 
districts (SSDs), and the rest by PR. Had the new system been applied to the following 
general elections, it would have meant there was a real chance of having a “divided” 
government between the two chambers. Such division would be a particular problem 
because the chambers have equal power to confer or withdraw their confidence in the 
11
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government. Although popularly discredited, the parliament was thus forced to legislate 
electoral reform before eventually going to early elections (which are called by the 
president of the republic).
The new electoral law introduced a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system (Shugart 
2001; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001) in which three-quarters of the Chamber seats (475) 
were allocated in SSDs via plurality, and the remaining one-quarter (155) via party lists 
through proportional representation. The PR seat allocation formula was changed to Hare 
quota and largest remainders (LR) with a nationwide threshold of 4 percent, now with 
closed lists instead of the open lists that had prevailed in the preceding PR period (see 
Table 1). The MMM system was in operation between 1993 and 2005.
The plurality and PR tiers were linked through a complex mechanism of “negative vote 
transfers (scorporo)” (D’Alimonte 2005, 257). The aim of this mechanism was to reduce 
the disproportionality typical of plurality elections by deducting votes from those parties 
that win SSDs. In the assignment of PR seats, the first step is the calculation of the 
“effective vote” for each list in each constituency. This is done by subtracting, from a list’s 
total vote, a number one greater than the votes received by the second-placed candidates 
in all the SSDs where candidates affiliated with that list have won seats. The “effective 
vote” then becomes the tally used for determining the number of PR seats that go to each 
list. Once this calculation has been made, the second step is to determine which lists have 
received more than 4 percent of PR votes at the national level (regardless of the 
scorporo). These lists will get seats on the basis of their “effective vote” according to the 
LR-Hare method (D’Alimonte 2005, 257).
The biggest parties were more likely to win in the districts and thus would tend to suffer 
scorporo transfers. As a result, these parties sidestepped the negative vote transfer rule. 
They created “fake lists” that no voter knew about, and the surplus votes were subtracted 
from that list, avoiding the penalty to the real list.  The result of the scorporo was to 
render the system only partially compensatory, which is why it is properly considered a 
type of MMM system, rather than mixed-member proportional (Shugart and Wattenberg 
2001).
The system hardly differed for the two houses: as noted earlier, for the Chamber of 
Deputies, the proportional seats could go only to those parties that had received on a 
separate ballot at least 4 percent of the national vote. Such a nationwide threshold was 
not introduced for the Senate, where the PR seats were allocated on a regional basis. In 
addition, the Senate system allowed the best losers in regional constituencies to join the 
parliament. However, the scorporo negative vote transfer also operated in the Senate, 
albeit with a significant difference from the Chamber of Deputies: subtracting all the 
votes gathered by the winner in each district, and not just the vote difference between 
the winner and the first loser. This greatly limited the majoritarianism in the system, 
relative to that of the Chamber.
12
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The Electoral Reform of 2005: Back to Proportional Representation 
but with a Majority Bonus
Another electoral reform took place in 2005. In this case, the system was changed as a 
defensive mechanism in response to anticipated potential electoral losses by the 
governing center-right coalition, headed by Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia party. 
The new law scrapped the mixed-member system and was touted as a possible 
“simplification” of the party system structure. The law stipulated a proportional system 
with closed lists that allocates a sizable seat “majority bonus”—guaranteeing 55 percent 
of seats—to whichever pre-electoral coalition of parties obtained the highest number of 
votes. The new law introduced a defined rule for these coalitions, obligating lists to 
adhere formally to them by specifying the name of the political leader of the coalition 
from the outset. It thus introduced a strongly majoritarian element, by prioritizing pre-
electoral coalitions that could obtain a plurality. The proportional element came in only 
after the majority bonus was applied, allocating seats among the component parties of 
the winning and other coalitions.
Berlusconi’s government changed the electoral rules in advance of elections scheduled a 
year later (Massetti 2006; Benoit 2007). The leading advocates for changing the law were 
the smaller parties of the center-right coalition, such as the Union of the Centre (UDC) 
and the National Alliance, with strong support by the Northern League, whose leader was 
the principal rapporteur and author Roberto Calderoli. The law was approved only a few 
months before the 2006 election (Law 270, December 21, 2005) (Bardi 2007; Pasquino 
2007). The center-right coalition explicitly wanted to reintroduce a PR system given its 
better electoral performance in that tier vis-à-vis the SSDs in the past electoral system. 
However, the often-evoked implicit goal of the law to attempt to impede the likely success 
of the center-left resided in three aspects: (1) the nationalization of electoral competition, 
which was thought to be advantageous to Forza Italia, because of the gap between the 
appeal of its candidates and that of its party leader; (2) the way that the majority bonus 
was conferred (see next paragraph) and the geographic concentration of center-right 
support in two large districts in the north; and (3) differentiating the basis of allocation of 
seats in the two chambers. To elaborate on the last point, the likelihood of different 
coalitions winning each chamber would be increased through the differentiation of their 
rules for allocating seats, combined with the different geographical pattern of the 
electoral strength of the parties. In other words, Berlusconi’s goal was, in part, to 
engineer divisions among his opponents, as well as enhance his own party’s prospects of 
seat maximization.
The peculiarity of the 2005 electoral reform is the way the majority bonus was attributed 
in the Senate: the majority bonus was allocated region by region. Therefore, each 
electoral plurality in each region obtained 55 percent of seats attributed to that specific 
region. Consequently, winning in the most populous regions with the largest district 
magnitude would increase the possibility of obtaining a majority of seats in the Senate.
Given the different parties’ electoral strongholds, the possibility of having a “divided 
14
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government” was very likely. The consequence is that this mechanism does not guarantee 
clear majority for any block in the Senate, unlike the national majority-bonus provision in 
the Chamber of Deputies Thus, the result of the Senate became a sort of lottery. In fact, 
the center-left obtained a sizable majority of seats in the Chamber, but not in the Senate, 
where it was in the majority by only two seats.
Together with the majority bonus to the winning coalition and closed-list PR, the new 
electoral law introduced a complex set of thresholds for seat allocations: 617 out of 630
Chamber seats were allocated among the parties that passed thresholds of the total vote 
on a national basis. The thresholds were as follows: (1) 10 percent for a coalition, 
(provided that at least one list within the pre-electoral coalition got 2 percent);  (2) 4 
percent for single parties; and (3) 2 percent for any party in a coalition, except for the 
first party below 2 percent in the coalition. For the Senate, the thresholds were the 
following, on a regional basis: (1) 20 percent for a coalition (provided that at least one list 
got 3 percent); (2) 8 percent for any party not in a coalition; and (3) 3 percent for any 
party in a coalition (there is no exception for the first party in a coalition below this 
threshold, unlike the Chamber).  These systems were in place for three elections, 2006, 
2008, and 2013.
In 2014, the Constitutional Court entered the electoral-reform fray when it declared 
unconstitutional the previous electoral law of 2005. In particular, the Constitutional Court 
ruled inapplicable the majority bonus, and specified that the voter must be allowed to 
cast a preference vote (Constitutional Law n. 1/2014). The court thus reintroduced the 
electoral system in operation between 1991 and 1993, but also modified the law by also 
introducing preference voting for the Senate (Ceccanti 2016). In response, parliament 
approved a new electoral system in 2015.
The Electoral System Reform of 2015 and the Italicum
The new electoral law came into force in July 2016 (D’Alimonte 2015; Chiaramonte 2015; 
Pasquino 2015). However, it has not been used in any general election, and it was 
partially modified by the Constitutional Court in 2017 (detailed in the chapter postscript). 
The main political actors involved in the process were the Democratic Party and its 
leader, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. Basically all other parties were against the reform, 
except Forza Italia, which had voted in favor initially and then later withdrew its support. 
At first glance, the 2015 system shows similarities with the 2005 laws. Both have bonus 
provisions. However, the new bonus adjustment mechanism—the so-called Italicum—
differs in that the majority bonus is allocated to the most voted list, unlike in the 2005 
system where it was allocated to a coalition of parties. The list receiving the plurality of 
votes is to be allocated 340 MPs out of 618  deputies, provided that it reaches 40 
percent  of the valid votes at the national level (no further bonus is awarded if the list 
already had that quota through proportional distribution). If no list gets this many votes, 
the law provided that a runoff would be held two weeks later between the two most voted 
lists.  This is highly unusual, as there are few examples of runoffs in list systems for 
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national assemblies.  As it happened, the Constitutional Court invalidated the runoff 
provision in a ruling in 2017. The peculiarity of the Italicum is that it will only be in 
function for the Chamber. For the Senate, the electoral law is PR without a majority 
bonus, which was the 2005 law after the changes introduced by the Constitutional Court 
in 2014.
The Italicum foresaw only one legal threshold to enable access to the distribution of seats. 
Such access was allowed solely for those lists that reach at least 3 percent of valid votes 
nationwide. Once the majority bonus is assigned (in this sense the system is majority 
assuring, whatever the result of the first round), the rest of seats are allocated with PR 
(Hare quota and largest remainders) to the lists that have met the national threshold.
The new electoral law reintroduces a feature of the 1948–1993 system, the open list, but 
with features protecting list heads and encouraging gender balance. Voters will be 
permitted to cast up to two preference votes for candidates of their party by writing the 
corresponding names on the ballot. The first provision limiting the openness of the list is 
that parties may protect their list head in each of the hundred districts (ranging in 
magnitude from three to nine). Any list head can run in up to ten different districts but 
must opt for one if elected in more than one.  This provision potentially expands the 
number of seats allocated via preference votes due to the fact that in other districts 
where the list head has been elected, seats will be allocated to candidates solely via 
preference votes.
The second limitation on openness is that any voters’ second preference is void if cast for 
a candidate of the same gender as the first one.  Further provisions intended to promote 
more balanced gender representation are (1) each party list must contain equal numbers 
of men and women; (2) in publishing their lists, parties must alternate men and women; 
and (3) no more than 60 percent of the list heads for any party across districts may be of 
the same gender. However, because the list is completely open other than for the list 
head, the final order of election from a list will not necessarily be gender balanced. On 
balance, these features mean that if a party wins only one seat in the district, it will be 
allocated to the list head, while from the second onward, seats will be allocated solely 
according to preference votes.
Consequences of Electoral Systems in Italy
Having now reviewed Italy’s electoral systems of the postwar period, we turn to their 
consequences. For almost fifty years the political system had featured highly unstable 
governments in part due to the fragmentation of the party system, albeit with stability in 
political and governmental personnel (Cotta and Verzichelli 2009). This was a 
consequence of a pure proportional electoral system, which offered several chances to 
small parties to be represented (Ignazi 2002). Neither of the two biggest parties was able 
to govern alone, and the Christian Democrats were prone to forming oversized coalitions 
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(Newell and Bull 1997). Dissatisfaction with the performance of the PR system led to the 
first major electoral reform, that of 1993. This section will consider several indicators of 
electoral system impacts on the party system, for each of Italy’s electoral systems over 
time.
Electoral Reform and Governmental Stability
As a result of the introduction of a polarizing political actor—Silvio Berlusconi—the party 
system and electoral competition moved toward a bipolar framework. Beginning with the 
1994 general elections, there were three power turnovers between center-right and 
center-left coalitions. However, the fragmentation of the coalitions and the weakness and 
heterogeneous nature of the parties affected governmental stability and ability to 
implement programs and policies. In essence, Giuseppe Di Palma’s (1977) words from 
more than forty years ago still rang true, in that Italian parties continued to survive 
without governing. Moreover, a new party, the Five Star Movement (M5S), which won the 
highest percentage of the vote for any individual party in the 2013 elections (albeit with 
only 25.6 percent), may be generating a tripolar party system as an unexpected outcome 
of electoral reform.
The electoral law first adopted in the general election of 1994 did not produce 
governmental stability. The paradox is that it generated identifiability without stability 
(durability of governments). In the space of less than twenty years, Italy experienced 
twelve governments (two of which were technocratic), six different prime ministers, two 
oversized coalitions, and two changes of parliamentary majorities during the same 
legislature. The first Berlusconi government collapsed—due to the defection of the Lega 
Nord (Northern League)—after just over half a year in office (Cento Bull and Gilbert 
2001; Passarelli and Tuorto 2012; Passarelli 2013b). The early dissolution of parliament, 
the change of prime ministers, the lack of support by a parliamentary majority, and the 
ensuing instability and party fragmentation have remained the main characteristics of the 
Italian political system despite the 1994 and 2005 reforms.  Such tendencies were 
detectable in the political and institutional dynamics, which are exemplified by both the 
1994–2001 and 2006–2008 periods, lasting through both “majoritarian” and a 
“proportional” electoral law, respectively (Capano 1997; Bull and Pasquino 2007; Donovan 
1995; Hine 1996; Gilbert 1998).
The Party System and the Electoral Reforms
Italy’s electoral reforms also offer an opportunity to explore the effect of the electoral 
system on the party system. Table 2 shows several indicators of the party system, by 
election and by period means, representing Italy’s different electoral systems. For the 
effective number of seat-winning parties (N ) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; see also the 
chapter in this volume by Shugart and Taagepera), we can observe the following: during 
the First Republic (1948–1992), the average was 3.71, while during the majoritarian 
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electoral system for the Second Republic, the average was 6.35. For the majority-bonus 
PR system, 2006–2013, it was 3.87. Thus, surprisingly, N  was at its highest during the 
period of the MMM electoral system. We see the same pattern with N , the effective 
number of vote-earning parties.
S
V
Electoral Systems in Context: Italy
Page 15 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an 
individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 11 March 2018
Table 2 The effects of electoral systems on political and electoral outcomes in Italy (1948–2013)
Legislat
ure
Two biggest parties Gallaghe
r index
Eff Nv Eff Ns Parties 
with 
seats
Electoral
Volatility
Index of 
nationali
zation
Electoral
system
year votes seats  
OLPR (up 
to 4 
votes)
1948 79.5 77.5 3.64 2.95 2.57 10 - 0.833
1953 62.7 64.4 3.68 4.18 3.54 9 14.1 0.836
1958 65.0 65.6 2.74 3.87 3.45 12 5.2 0.856
1963 63.5 67.6 2.58 4.16 3.74 10 8.5 0.864
1968 66.0 70.3 2.66 3.94 3.53 9 7.8 0.870
1972 65.8 70.6 3.25 4.08 3.55 9 5.3 0.866
1976 73.1 77.8 2.75 3.53 3.16 11 9.1 0.888
1979 68.7 73.5 2.69 3.91 3.47 12 5.3 0.874
1983 62.8 67.1 2.57 4.52 4.02 13 8.3 0.861
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1987 60.9 65.2 2.52 4.62 4.07 14 9.1 0.859
OLPR (1 
vote)
1992 45.8 49.7 2.51 6.63 5.71 16 19 0.785
MMM 1994 41.4 35.2 7.81 7.58 7.67 7 (9) 36.7 0.749
1996 41.6 46.8 6.91 7.17 6.09 8(10) 13.0 0.798
2001 46.0 52.4 10.22 6.32 5.3 5 (6) 22.4 0.830
Majority-
bonus PR
2006 41.5 41.7 3.61 5.69 5.06 13 9.5 0.865
2008 70.6 76.7 5.73 3.82 3.07 7 9.7 0.836
2013 51.0 63.5 17.34 5.33 3.47 10 39.1 0.836
period
means
1948–
2013
59.2 62.7 4.89 4.84 4.20 10.3 13.9 0.841
1948–
1992
64.9 68.1 2.87 4.22 3.71 11.4 9.2 0.854
1994–
2001
43.0 44.8 8.31 7.02 6.35 6.7 (8.3) 24.0 0.792
Electoral Systems in Context: Italy
Page 17 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an 
individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 11 March 2018
2006–
2013
54.4 60.6 8.89 4.95 3.87 10.0 19.4 0.845
Sources: Author’s calculations from data from the Italian Ministry of the Interior; Passarelli (2014).
(*) For the MMM period, data refer to the PR component except the numbers in parentheses for parties with seats, which refer to 
SSDs.
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The reason for the seeming anomaly of party system fragmentation peaking under MMM 
lies in a peculiar complexity of the system identified earlier—the establishment of fake 
lists to benefit from the scorporo process of partial compensation. While many new 
parties thus entered and won votes and seats, these parties were grouped into alliances, 
which were coordinated in the SSDs of this system, and generated “fake lists” to 
minimize their negative vote transfers from the SSDs to the PR component. In fact, when 
we consider the actual number of parties that won at least one seat, we find that number 
declined in the MMM period, but—strikingly—it was greater in the SSDs (8.3, on average) 
than in the list component (6.7). This is due to the alliances being represented by 
different parties in different districts, and also to ethno-regionalist parties being able to 
win (very few) seats in their strongholds.  The number of seat-winning parties was 
higher in the pure-list periods (1948–1992 and 2006–2013), as we might expect. However, 
many of these parties were very small, as revealed by the lower effective numbers during 
that period.
As reported in Table 2, in 2008, there was a significant reduction in the number of parties 
winning seats, compared to 2005, the first election under the majority-bonus list PR 
system. However, that was due to the birth of two new parties, each resulting from the 
merging of two existing parties. The merger between Forza Italia and the National 
Alliance created the People of Freedom led by Berlusconi, while the Democrats of the Left 
and the Daisy formed the basis of the Democratic Party on the center-left. These parties 
obtained approximately 75 percent of votes and as many seats, the highest top-2 
percentage since 1976. Nevertheless, the power acquired by the two parties eroded, not 
least due to their joint participation in the unity government “rainbow coalition” they 
formed after Berlusconi’s resignation due to judicial and financial troubles.
Regarding the proportionality of the system, we can use the Gallagher (1991) index of 
disproportionality (see also the chapter by Shugart and Taagepera) to compare across 
electoral systems. The lowest index value was recorded in 1987 and 1992 (2.5), when the 
purely PR system was in place. The average during the initial PR period was 2.87, 
whereas the two “majoritarian” periods have had high values, as we would expect from 
either MMM (average 8.31) or the majority-bonus system (8.89). The election of 2013, 
when the party system fragmented again due to the arrival of the Five Star Movement, 
saw an extraordinarily high value for a “PR” system, 17.3. This resulted from the bonus 
provision awarding nearly half the seats to a party with barely a quarter of the votes—the 
Democratic Party—as the main partner in the alliance that won the plurality.
Electoral Reform and Voters: Accountability and Volatility
Although we might detect a general shift toward a bipolar structure since 1994, and a 
quasi-two-party system in 2008, Italy has also seen substantial electoral volatility. This 
includes the eruption of new parties such as the populist Five Star Movement. In part, 
this comes as an unintended consequence of electoral reform, as discussed next.
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Especially with the 2006–2013 period and the presence of a majority-bonus proportional 
system, without preference voting (closed list), the party (in central office) greatly 
strengthened its power in recruiting party personnel. This increased the voters’ 
disaffection due to the diminishing ability to affect the choice of candidates and, to some 
extent, to determine social representation (especially in terms of gender, expertise, and 
generation). The frustration felt by citizens was, in the end, one of the main factors 
favoring abstentions, the rise of populist parties such as the Northern League, the 
flourishing of new (and significant) parties such as the Five Star Movement, and so on. 
Most interestingly, if we consider electoral volatility, it is possible to observe that the 
1994–2001 elections registered a different score: they obtained the highest period 
average in terms of volatility (24.0, as shown in Table 2). In the 2013 election volatility 
was even higher (39.1), mostly due to the extraordinary success of the Five Star 
Movement, as well as from retrospective voting on ruling parties’ performances (ITANES 
2013).
Votes for a particular candidate were possible under the 1948–1993 electoral system, 
because of the open lists. However, given the SSDs of the 1993 electoral reform, voters 
started to attach more importance to the characteristics of candidates than previously 
(ITANES 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013; Bellucci and Segatti 2011). Moreover, voters have 
generally become increasingly accustomed to bipolar competition and the expectation of 
having a government that is a reflection of electoral results, and not, as in the past, based 
on parliamentary bargaining. The collapse of the pre-1989 party system further opened 
the door to different electoral behavior, in tandem with new parties that were not linked 
to historical political traditions. The success of the M5S in 2013, attractive to younger 
voters (about 44 percent according to ITANES 2013), and the Northern League since 
1992–1994 highlights the need for parties to focus on a few regions where the number of 
seats allocated to the Senate was greater, as in Lombardy, Campania, or Veneto. This was 
particularly true for the Senate and especially after the 2005 electoral reform.
This brings us to a brief examination of electoral nationalization, shown in Table 2. There 
exists the possibility that electoral laws can affect the ratio between what parties obtain 
at a regional level and the numbers they achieve throughout the entire territory. The 
index of nationalization, which varies between 0 and 1—the lower the index, the higher 
the parties’ concentration of votes in a few areas, and the higher the index, the higher the 
nationalization of the vote (Caramani 2004; Bochsler 2010; Passarelli 2013a)—has been 
quite homogenous during the entire period. The lowest level was registered in 1994 
(0.749), and the highest in 1976 (0.888). In terms of the effects of electoral systems, we 
can observe a lower nationalization during the mixed-member period (0.79), when the 
SSDs meant that parties with regional base were privileged, vis-à-vis quite similar higher 
values in the other two periods (about 0.85).
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Conclusions
Italy has experienced three major electoral reforms in the last twenty-five years and 
multiple elections under quite different systems: PR, MMM, and majority-bonus PR. The 
chapter’s review of the main political results in the Italian context and electoral reforms 
has partially confirmed our knowledge of the effects that electoral systems have produced 
(Gallagher 1975, 1992; Shugart 2005). However, not all the political expectations were 
realized. For example, the effects of the 1993 reform on both parties and voters were 
important, even if it did not achieve the political goals of strengthening parliamentary 
majorities, prolonging governments, and increasing accountability. In particular, the 
absence of big, cohesive national parties has mitigated the effects of electoral reforms, 
especially in the case of the mixed-member majoritarian system (1994–2001), as the 
decline of the percentages of votes and seats allocated to the two biggest parties has 
confirmed. Beyond the electoral laws’ technicalities and details, the important lessons 
from the Italian case is that so much system change compared to other countries is 
mostly explained by party system fragmentation and governmental instability. From a 
theoretical perspective, then, the Italian case perfectly fits with the research question on 
the effects of electoral systems. The case has empirically demonstrated that the electoral 
system alone cannot change the political system if the electoral reforms are not coupled 
with other features. Consistent with an observation made over forty years ago by Sartori 
(1976; see also Renwick 2010; Baldini 2011), the most important contextual reason that 
electoral reform in Italy has disappointed its advocates is the absence of strong national 
parties.
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Postscript: Recent Developments
Following the outcome of a referendum and a ruling of the Constitutional Court, the 
electoral system of Italy remains in flux. This postscript will review some developments 
since the passage of the electoral reform of 2015. Beyond the technicalities and 
arguments for and against the reform, the ability of the reform to take effect was 
conditional on the approval of the constitutional referendum in 2016. On December 4, 
2016, Italian voters expressed their vote on a referendum about constitutional reforms. 
The electoral results led to Prime Minister Renzi’s resignation and, a week later, a new 
government headed by Paolo Gentiloni, former minister of foreign affairs under Renzi. 
Because it failed, the country was left for several months in a situation of potential 
stalemate.
This was the third referendum of its kind in Italy, with the other two having been held in 
2001 and 2006. The two options presented to voters in 2016 were related to the approval 
or rejection of the reform promoted by Renzi’s government and his center-left 
parliamentary majority.  The result of the referendum was both clear and decisive. 
Approximately 60 percent of voters cast a “no” vote in opposition to the proposed 
reforms. Perhaps the most striking result was voter turnout. Nearly 70 percent of eligible 
voters cast a vote, a percentage that is similar to that reached in general elections in Italy 
(e.g., 75 percent in 2013). This figure also confirms that Italy remains a democracy with 
one of the highest electoral participation rates in the world. Despite this high turnout 
figure, one of the most notable features of the referendum is the persistent north–south 
divide in terms of turnout and the level of rejection of the reform. Rejection of the 
referendum was particularly high in southern regions, with peaks in Sicily, Sardinia, and 
Campania. Support for the referendum was limited and prevailed in only two regions (i.e., 
Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna), as well as in the province of Bolzano.
The elimination of Italy’s “perfect” or symmetrical bicameralism was central to the 
reform. Such bicameralism is unique among contemporary parliamentary democracies 
and is a subject of much debate by politicians and scholars alike. It has contributed to 
political instability, especially after 1994, as the risk of different majorities in the two 
branches has increased due to differences in who selects deputies and how.  These 
different electorates have divergent electoral behaviors that are further accentuated by 
the regional allocation of seats for the Senate versus the national allocation for the 
Chamber.
The law approved in 2015 did not change the Senate’s electoral law, because the reform’s 
supporters thought the referendum would pass. Therefore, similar majorities cannot be 
ensured. The possibility of having two very different electoral laws for the two Chambers 
in a context of symmetric bicameralism may generate uncertainty and political weakness. 
A first clarification came from the Constitutional Court decision on January 25, 2017. The 
court intervened by invalidating parts of the law. In particular, the decision dropped the 
second ballot to allocate the majority bonus for the Chamber of Deputies to make “more 
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similar” the two electoral systems for the two Houses, albeit the Senate would still have a 
regional allocation of seats. However, the supreme judges kept the provision of a majority 
bonus allocated to the party with 40 percent of votes.  After the 2016 referendum, 
another (!) electoral law has been approved,  even beyond the changes the 
Constitutional Court made. Under the Italian electoral sky, it seems that many things 
happen and nothing changes. Theoretically, if the parliament would not approve any other 
change, it could also be possible to have general elections with two different systems for 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
It remains true that Italy still lacks a coherent electoral law and still has two chambers 
with the same powers, and it cannot be taken for granted that parliament will approve a 
new electoral law. Electoral uncertainty continues in Italy.
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Notes:
( ) Renwick (2010, 111) reports five reforms, including the first electoral law introduced 
in 1946 after the end of fascism, and the 1954 law that reintroduced that of 1948 after 
the 1953 change. See also Clementi (2015). In fact, Italy had five electoral laws: 1948, 
1953, 1993, 2005, and 2015, to which we could add the electoral law—albeit never 
applied—generated by the 2014 constitutional judgement that abolished the 2005 law.
( ) The calculation of the quota is as follows: , where V is valid votes, M is the 
district magnitude, and n varies with the specific provision of the system. In the 1946 law, 
the provision was for n = 1 (equivalent to Hagenbach-Bischoff or Droop) in districts of M
≤ 20 seats, and n = 2 in higher-magnitude districts. As explained later, and in Table 1, the 
definition of the quota was changed in subsequent laws of this period.
( ) A constitutional referendum was held on June 2, 1946, and the Constituent Assembly 
was elected at the same time: the choice was between the republic or the monarchy, 
which was the existing Italian form of state. The republic obtained 54.3 percent of votes, 
whereas the monarchy obtained 45.7 percent. The law allowed for only one preference 
vote in 1946. The proportional system was used by the DC to divide the left field, 
especially the PSI from the PCI. In that way, the hegemonic role of the DC was not in 
danger, as it was guaranteed by the Cold war system (Clementi 2015).
( ) Specifically, thirty-one multiseat constituencies and one single-seat constituency for 
the Valle d’Aosta.
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( ) The thresholds applied to the remainder seats only. Parties could thus gain access to 
the parliament through district seats, as in the cases of regionalist parties such as Union 
valdôtaine or the Svp (Südtiroler Volkspartei), which won their seats in a district but do 
not have access to the distribution of the remainder seats.
( ) According to Article 59 of the presidential decree (n. 361/1957), voters could cast up 
to three preferences in a district with a magnitude equal to or less than fifteen. In bigger 
districts, four preference votes were allowed.
( ) The steps to assign the remaining seats were as follows: (1) all votes not used to win a 
seat were collected together at the national district (collegio unico nazionale); (2) at this 
level the number of seats to each party was calculated; (3) to decide where those seats 
would be allocated, a rank among the districts was made—therefore, party X would have 
won its seats in the districts with the highest remainders in percentage (e.g., if party X 
obtained a 50 percent remainder out of the quorum, then the first seats will be allocated, 
etc.); and (4) finally, in terms of which candidate will be elected, that with the highest 
number of preferences will be considered first.
( ) In 1948, the definition of the quota was changed to , and in 1956 back to 
. The 1948–1953 formula generated an extraordinarily low quota, which would 
benefit the larger parties (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 587; Shugart and Taagepera 
2017, 36–39). See Table 1 for a summary of these changes.
( ) A similar proposal was adopted during the fascist era, in 1924. The Acerbo law gave 
the party that won the most votes two-thirds of the seats. However, the bonus was 
possible only if the party got at least 25 percent of the votes.
( ) A minor change was approved in 1956: it slightly increased the proportionality of the 
system without changing its identity (Renwick 2010, 119). The value +2 in the Imperiali 
quota formula was introduced at the district level together with the provision of obtaining 
at the least three hundred thousand votes.
( ) The choice to call the referendum was motivated by the fact that the Senate had a 
dual formula. It would function as an SSD system wherever a candidate obtained 65 
percent of votes; seats not filled in SSDs were instead allocated at the regional level via 
the D’Hondt method. In fact, few seats were filled as SSDs: on average, only 3.6 senators 
per election (out of 315) were elected this way. Therefore, the referendum calling for the 
abrogation of the 65 percent clause implied shifting the Senate to a plurality system. In 
contrast, the Chamber had a strictly PR system.
( ) For the election of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, in 1993, Italy was divided into 
twenty-seven districts (circoscrizioni). However, given that the distribution of the PR 
seats was calculated at the national level, as in the PR system previously adopted, 
districts served only to choose individual candidates inside the party lists. In contrast, for 
the Senate, each region is a separate district and votes are not pooled nationally. The 
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meaning of “the Senate is elected on a regional basis” provision (Article 57) remains 
subject to debate by scholars.
( ) For example, if the “RED” candidate won an SSD with 45,000 votes and the runner-up 
got 42,100 votes, as a consequence, the vote to the PR list linked to the “RED” candidate 
was reduced by 2,901. The logic was to “drop” the vote surplus used to win the SSD. 
Moreover, if a party was connected to more than one list, then the “excess votes” (2,901 
in our example) were partitioned among the affiliated list on the basis of the PR vote of 
each list.
( ) In 2006 and 2008: Lombardy (forty-seven seats; forty-nine in 2013), Campania (thirty 
seats; twenty-nine in 2013), Lazio (twenty-seven seats; twenty-eight in 2013), Sicily 
(twenty-six seats; twenty-five in 2013), Veneto (twenty-four seats), Piedmont (twenty-two 
seats), Emilia-Romagna (twenty-one seats; twenty-two in 2013), Tuscany (eighteen seats), 
Apulia (eighteen seats; twenty in 2013), Calabria (ten seats), Sardinia (nine seats; eight in 
2013), Liguria (eight seats), Marches (eight seats), Umbria (seven seats), Basilicata 
(seven seats), Abruzzo (seven seats), Trentino Alto Adige (seven seats), Friuli Venezia 
Giulia (seven seats), and Molise (two seats).
( ) Additionally, one MP is elected from the Aosta Valley (SSD) and twelve are elected by 
a constituency consisting of Italians living abroad.
( ) Among coalitions that do not satisfy this requirement, the list that passes 4 percent 
on a national basis has access to the seat distribution. The same provision applies to the 
coalition running for the Senate, where the threshold is equal to 8 percent for single list 
in the coalition.
( ) The law also allowed multiple candidacies in different districts, thus placing a 
supplementary power in the hands of the central party in choosing candidates.
( ) Together with parliamentary reforms, one must also consider the series of popular 
attempts to change the electoral system. Coherently with the tradition of 1991 and 1993, 
two referenda were called: in 1999 and in 2000. Although both obtained more “yes” votes 
than “no” votes, meaning that voters supported the changes (basically dropping the 
proportional part of the 25 percent of seats as established by the 1993 law), both 
referendums failed because they did not clear the required threshold of voter turnout of 
50 percent +1 of voters (in part because the voter list was outdated).
( ) In the Chamber, 630 deputies are divided into 618 members elected from the national 
territory and 12 members elected by Italians living abroad, elected through PR. 
Therefore, it is highly likely that the winning list would gain a few additional seats.
( ) Different proposals were presented during the parliamentary debate: in particular, at 
the beginning the threshold was placed at 35 percent and then at 37 percent.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Electoral Systems in Context: Italy
Page 28 of 29
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 11 March 2018
( ) No formal alliances (the so-called apparentamento) are allowed for the runoff 
between lists that competed in the first round.
( ) See the chapter on France by Hoyo for examples of runoffs among lists at the 
subnational level.
( ) The Constitutional Court changed this provision to determination by lot.
( ) The preferences are not ranked, but there are two lines for a voter to cast preference 
votes by writing in candidate names. If the candidate written on the second line is not of 
a different gender from the one on the first line, the second preference vote is invalid.
( ) The average government tenure was eleven months during the First Republic (1948–
1992).
( ) For another prominent example of multiparty alliances coordinating on nominations 
in SSDs, see the chapter in this volume by Ziegfeld on India.
( ) The reform was approved earlier by an absolute majority in both houses of 
parliament, but the proposed changes required a two-thirds majority in parliament to be 
implemented without a referendum according to the Italian constitution (Article 138.3). 
Since this threshold was not met in parliament, the referendum was called (by the 
government) by collecting the required number of voter signatures, as stated by Article 
138.2, while the opponents to the reform were not able to get the minimum number of 
required signatures (five hundred thousand).
( ) Chamber: minimum voter age is 18 years old. Senate: minimum voter age is 25 years 
old.
( ) The Constitutional Court has changed another aspect related to the party list heads. 
Since list heads can be candidates in up to ten different districts, if they are elected in 
more than one district, then the allocation to the “district” will come by lot, rather than at 
the list head’s option.
( ) In Autumn 2017 the Italian Parliament approved a new electoral law expected to later 
pass the Senate. The MMM system features 37% SSD seats and 63% elected by closed 
list PR (Hare) with a maximum M of 7 or 8, and no linkage between the tiers. The 
threshold is set at 3% for party/list or 10% for coalition, with a lower threshold for lists 
representing linguistic minorities. Parties can nominate no more than 60% of their 
candidates from the same gender.
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